Chilcot report delivers damning Iraq evidence against Tony Blair

The inquiry led by Sir John Chilcot into Britain's participation in the Iraq War has delivered a scathing critique of the then prime minister Tony Blair and his government's actions in the lead up to, during , and in the aftermath of the conflict.

Blair's decision to lead Britain into the war alongside the United States was not the "last resort", according to the findings of the Chilcot report into the country's involvement.

The senior civil servant in charge of the inquiry, Sir John Chilcot, issued the statement announcing what they had found on Wednesday morning.

The full report of the inquiry can be found at: www.iraqinquiry.org.uk/the-report/

“The U.K. chose to join the invasion of Iraq before the peaceful options for disarmament had been exhausted,” Chilcot revealed as he announced the results of his seven-year inquiry.

“Military action at that time was not a last resort.”

The investigation into the events leading to the war, its execution, and aftermath is vastly critical of government ministers, the intelligence services and the military. Perhaps the biggest impact will be felt by former Prime Minister Tony Blair, the man responsible for Britain’s involvement.

Sir John also criticised the lack of planning that was carried out during the period after the fall of Saddam, which saw British troops involved in a prolonged and bloody occupation.

"Despite explicit warnings, the consequences of the invasion were underestimated. The planning and preparations for Iraq after Saddam Hussein were wholly inadequate," Chilcot said.

The report was highly critical of the former prime minister's relationship with George Bush, specifically that Blair was too confident in believing that he could influence the opinion of the former Whitehouse occupant. It comments that he "overestimated" his ability in this regard.

In a confidential memo to US president at the time George Bush, Blair said that "I will be with you, whatever".

According to the findings of the report, the intelligence gathered surrounding the existence and production of Weapons of Mass Destruction was weak, and should have received a greater challenge.

"They were not challenged – and they should have been," said Chilcot.

Chilcot found that Blair exaggerated the threat posed by the Iraqi regime as he attempted to make the case for military action to MPs and the public in the build-up to the invasion in 2002 and 2003. The prime minister disregarded warnings about the possible consequences of military action, and relied too heavily on his own beliefs, rather than the more nuanced judgments of the intelligence services. “The judgments about Iraq’s capabilities ... were presented with a certainty that was not justified,” the report says.

It was the belief of the inquiry that the regime led by Saddam Hussein was "not an imminent threat", citing Iran, North Korea and Libya as posing more danger in the short term than Iraq. It would have taken the regime five years to be able to produce a highly dangerous chemical or biological weapon.

The actions of the Ministry of Defence and military forces were also criticised by the report, saying that the invasion was planned in a rush and was slow to react to security operations on the ground, particularly the use of improvised explosive devices (IEDs) that killed so many troops.